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CRITICIZING THE COURTS:

A LAWYER'S DUTY

Roger J. Miner*
In observing the work of lawyers in the courts in which I
have served, as well as in other courts, I have been impressed
generally with the service that the bar has rendered in the
representation of clients.

I have not been quite so impressed,

however, with the performance of the bar in the discharge of its
duty to socie·ty as a whole.

It is the willingness to accept this

public responsibility that distinguishes the bar as a profession.
The value of the calling is diminished to the extent that any one
lawyer shirks his. or her professional obligation of service to
the community.
There are many duties implicated in the concept of public
responsibility -- the duty to undertake the representation of
indigent clients without chargel Cif more lawyers performed this
duty, perhaps the public expense for such representation could be
greatly reduced or eliminated); the duty to see that able and
honest men and women are appointed or elected as judges;2 the
duty to aid in the improvement of legal education;3 the duty to
maintain the competence and integrity of the bar,4 and to
disclose violations of the rules of professional conduct;S the
duty to set an example and maintain public confidence by avoiding
even minor violations of law;6 the duty to seek legislative and
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administrative changes to improve the law and the legal system;?
and the duty to educate the publics and to protect it from the
unauthorized practice of law.9
In my opinion, one of the most important societal duties of
lawyers is the duty to criticize the courts.

It is my premise

that informed criticism of the courts and their decisions is not
merely a right but an ethical obligation imposed upon every
member of the bar.

I also believe that judges should not respond

to such criticism, directly or indirectly, since judicial
response dampens the enthusiasm of the bar and disserves the
public interest.
There is a Canon in the Code of Professional Responsibility
that instructs lawyers to assist in improving the legal system.10
The Ethical Considerations relating to that Canon observe that
lawyers are especially qualified to recognize deficiencies in the
system and to initiate corrective measures.11

They encourage the

legal profession to support changes in the law when existing
rules eventuate in unjust results.12

The Preamble to the new

Model Rules of Professional Conduct adopted by the American Bar
Association urges that lawyers should employ their knowledge to
reform the law.13

In my opinion these admonitions speak to a

duty on the part of lawyers to identify and discuss incorrect
actions by the courts, subject only to the requirement that the
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criticism be impelled by a good-faith desire for improvement in
the law and the legal system.
Malicious or false statements about a judge or disruptive or
contemptuous conduct in the court.iciom, of course, never can be
countenanced.

I have kept with me for nearly thirty years a case

I read in law. school regarding a penalty imposed for behavior of
this type.

The decision is taken from the ancient English

Reports and is one of those collected by Sir James Dyar, sometime
Chief Justice of Common Pleas.

It is reported as follows:

RICHARDSON, Chief Justice of C.B. at the
assizes at Salisbury in the summer of 1631
was assaulted by a prisoner condemned there
for felony, who after his condemnation threw
a brick bat at the said Judge, which narrowly
missed; and for this an indictment was
immediately drawn • • • against the prisoner,
and his right hand cut off and fixed to the
gibbet, upon which he was himself immediately
hanged in the presence of the Court.14
It seems to me that the judge overreacted somewhat in spite of
the provocation.

Of course, there are those today who would

consider tossing a brick to be "protected expression."

I do

realize that occasionally it is necessary for a lawyer to bite
his or her tongue when in the presence of some particularly
arbitrary tyrant in a black robe.

My father, who has been

practicing law for sixty years, holds in the highest regard the
lawyer who made some intemperate remark during a long and heated
argument with a judge. - When the judge shouted:
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"Counsellor, you

have been showing your contempt of this court," the lawyer
responded:

"No, your honor, I have been trying to conceal it."

While lawyers generally feel free to criticize the state of
the law in relation to rules of court, statutes and even the
Constitution itself, there is a noticeable reluctance to
criticize judge-made law, specific judicial decisions or
individual judges.

Yet, the public responsibility function of

the bar is just as implicated in the latter as in the former.
Why the distinction?

·r think that the answer lies in the

unfortunate, but well-grounded, fear on the part of attorneys
that affronts to tender judicial sensibilities may result in
unnecessary antagonisms, disciplinary action or worse.

For

example, in 1830, Judge James H. Peck of the United States
District Court for the District of Missouri disbarred and
imprisoned a lawyer for publishing a letter critical of one of
his decisions.15

Although this disgraceful episode led to an

impeachment proceeding and caused Congress to curtail the summary
contempt power of the federal courts,16 echoes of the Peck incident
were heard in a decision handed down by the Supreme Court in 1985.
The decision reversed a six-month suspension from federal
practice imposed upon Robert J. Snyder by the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals for conduct said to be prejudicial to the
administration of justice and unbecoming a member of the bar.17
Snyder's difficulties stemmed from a letter he wrote to the
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United States District Court for the District of North Dakota.
The letter was written after the circuit court had twice returned
his Criminal Justice Act fee application for insufficient
documentation.

In his correspondence, Snyder refused to provide

further information, criticized generally the inadequacy of the
fees authorized in similar cases, expressed his disgust at the
treatment afforded him by the circuit and directed that his name
be removed from the list of attorneys available for criminal
defense assignments .18

The district court judge, findi_ng nothing

offensive in the letter, and perceiving some merit in Snyder's
criticisms, passed the letter on to the circuit.

A three-judge

panel of the circ.ui t ultimately found that the statements, which
Snyder refused to retract, were disrespectful, contentious and
beyond the bounds of proper comment and criticism.19
In reversing the panel decision, then Chief Justice Burger
wrote:

"We do not consider a lawyer's criticism of the

administration of the [Criminal Justice] Act or criticism of
inequities in assignments under the Act as· cause for discipline
or suspension. • • •

Officers of the court may appropriately

express criticism on such matters."20

The Chief Justice observed

that the circuit court had acknowledged the meritorious nature of
Snyder's criticism and, as a result, had instituted a study of
the administration of the Criminal Justice Act.21

In light of

that observation, I believe that the Chief Justice missed an
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excellent opportunity to comment on the attorney's duty to
criticize the courts and the beneficial purposes served by the
performance of that duty.

Snyder's actions were well within the

bounds of the public responsibility he assumed when he became a
member of the bar.

This is so because a lawyer is obliged not

only to educate the public about the law, the legal system and
the judges, but to inform the courts as well.
Justice Jackson once commented that "lawyers are the only
group in a community who really know how well judicial work is
being done.

The public may rightfully look to them to be the

first to condemn practices or tendencies which they see departing
from the best judicial traditions. 11 22

Justice Brewer said:

"It

is a mistake to suppose that the Supreme Court is either honored
or helped by being spoken of as beyond criticism.

On the

contrary, the life and character of its justices should be the
objects of constant watchfulness by all, and its judgments
subject to the freest criticism."23

"I have no patience," said

Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone, "with the complaint that criticism
of judicial action involves any lack of respect for the courts.
When the courts deal, as ours do, with great public questions,
the only protection against unwise decisions, and even judicial
usurpation, is careful scrutiny of their action and fearless
comment upon it."24

Some years ago, in answer to a contention that criticism of
the Supreme Court and its decisions by the bar was unwise,
Raymond Moley, the political analyst, wrote the following:
The bar· in this· instance is acting in its
most significant role. A lawyer is something
more than a plain citizen. He is by tradition
and law an officer of the court and an agent of the
government.
To refrain from guidance would be to
shirk the bar's responsibility, as a professional
association, to the public and to government.

The Court is a responsible, human institution.
To elevate it above criticism would be to create
a tyranny above the law and above the government
of which it is a part.25
And so it is that when the Attorney General of the United
States publicly criticizes certain decisions of the Supreme
Court, as he has done in recent years,26 he is acting in the
highest traditions of the legal profession.

By leading serious

discussions of constitutional doctrine important to the citizenry
and to the courts, he performs the public service encouraged by
Moley and by Justices Jackson, Brewer and Stone.

It ill behooves

members of the bar to ridicule and abuse a fellow member of the
profession for fostering the robust and uninhibited debate that
is the hallmark of a free society.

When Stephen A. Douglas

denounced Abraham Lincoln for questioning the validity of the
infamous Dred Scott decision, Lincoln replied:
We believe as much as [Mr.] Douglas
(perhaps morel in obedience to and respect
for the judicial department of government.
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We think its decisions on constitutional
questions, when fully settled, should control
not only the particular case decided, but the
general policy of the country, subject to be
disturbed only by amendments of the
Constitution, as provided in that instrument
itself. More than this would be revolution.
But we think the Dred Scott decision is
erroneous. We know the court that made it
has often overrruled its own decisions, and
we shall do what we can to have it overrule
this.27
Lincoln was a great lawyer who understood well the public
responsibility of the bar.
It has never been the place of a judge, however, to respond
to specific criticism, and I think that it is unseemly for
Justices of the Supreme Court to engage in public argument with
the Attorney General or any other lawyer for the purpose of
defending the position of the Court on one issue or another.28
Such discourse not only detracts from the dignity of the court
but also communicates an unwillingness to maintain the openness
of mind so essential for the proper performance of the judicial
role.29

When the judiciary undertakes a point-by-point defense

of criticism leveled by members of the bar, it discourages what
it should encourage and protect.

Even in the case of unfair and

unjust criticism, the bench should remain silent, leaving to the
bar its ethical obligation to come to the defense of the
judiciary in such situations.30

It long has been recognized that

judges, "not being wholly free to defend themselves, are entitled
to receive the support of the bar against unjust criticism."31
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When Justice Brennan wrote in the Sawyer case that "lawyers are
free to criticise the state of the law,"32 he reserved no
rebuttal time for the judiciary.
Let me hasten to add that there are numerous matters upon
which judges can and should be heard -- matters affecting
administration of the legal system, improvements in substantive
and procedural law and ethical standards.33

A judge also should

teach and write about the law in an expository way, pointing to
trends and changes in decisions already·written·and in
legislation already adopted.34

Judges should encourage debate

about controversial constitutional and legal issues.35

I have

lectured and written about the public accountability of judges
the need for judges to report to the citizenry about developments
in the law and the legal system.36

Others have advocated

judicial participation in policy-making where matters affecting
the judicial process are concerned.

Judge Irving R. Kaufman, my

colleague on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, holds that
"[j]udges may not merely express their views on matters within
their judicial province, but have an obligation to do so in the
public interest.•37

However this may be, there is no reason for

judges to argue the merits of their decisions or views directly
with their critics.

It should always be remembered that judges

have an unfair advantage in any debate with lawyers, because
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judicial decisions -- at least until reversed, modified,
distinguished or overruled -- are the last word.
The judiciary should assure the bar that critical comments
of all kinds are welcomed.

It should heed the message of Justice

Frankfurter that "judges must be kept mindful of their
limitations and of their ultimate public responsibility by a
vigorous stream of criticism expressed with candor however
blunt."38

The Justices of the Supreme Court and of every other

court in the land must recognize, as did Frankfurter, that
lawyers "are under a special responsibility to exercise
fearlessness"39 in criticizing the courts.
Without question, the judiciary is accountable to the
public, just as any other public institution is accountable to
the public.

If judges are arbitrary, if their behavior is

improper, if their decisions are not well-grounded in
constitutional and legal principles, if their reasoning is
faulty, the bar is in the best position to observe and evaluate
the deficiencies, to inform the public and to suggest corrections.
When lawyers engage in criticism of the courts for constructive
and positive purposes, grounded in good faith and reason, the
judiciary is strengthened, the rule of law is reinforced and the
public duty of the bar is performed.
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